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Abstract 
Examination marking is often inaccurate.  This inaccuracy is shown to be structurally 
different from the classical approach to errors in variables.  Many economic 
problems can be analyzed within this generic “ teacher-student” framework where 
grading errors are the central feature.   Examples are submission to a peer reviewed 
journal, the job market, loans, crime, the market for lemons and matching problems 
such as marriage.   Students  decide whether to have their examinations graded based 
on a rational assessment of the costs and expected benefits.  This decision takes into 
account the teacher’s ability to grade accurately in addition to student assessment of 
the true grade.   (JEL C5, J15) 
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Many economic problems resemble examination marking on close inspection.  
Individuals decide whether it is worthwhile to undertake some particular activity 
(equivalent to entering an examination) and someone else (the examination grader) 
judges that activity.  Passing the examination implies a reward, but failure involves a 
cost.  Section V gives six examples; submitting an article for peer review: applying 
for a job: crime: loans: the market for lemons and marriage.  All of these problems 
can be thought of as a form of examination marking. 
The particular focus is the uncertainty surrounding the student’s true grade, 
which is typical in realistic applications.   It is not always possible to mark 
examinations with complete accuracy.  If two competent teachers  grade an essay or 
dissertation independently, in general, they award different marks.  Both give an 
honest assessment of what they think the correct grade is.  Examination marking is, 
therefore, an excellent paradigm to study economic problems that involve 
measurement errors.    The key argument is that the classical approach is not the right 
way to think about errors in examination marking and a fortiori, it is not the right way 
to think about errors in a wide class of economic problems.   
Econometric textbooks are dominated by the classical approach to 
measurement error, and it is not surprising that many researchers believe that this is 
the only plausible treatment.1   John Bound et al. (2001, p.3709) comment 
“Researchers virtually always rely on the assumption that measurement error is 
classical, usually with no justification at all”.  The assumption here is that 
examination marking errors are independent of reported values rather than the true 
values as in the classical approach.  What this means in practice is that those who 
grade do not make systematic mistakes in their marking.  Dean R. Hyslop and Guido 
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 W. Imbens (2001) refer to this as the optimal prediction error (OPE) model.   William 
Fuller (1987, p.79) also briefly discusses the OPE model and the idea is to champion 
this less usual approach.   Whereas these focus on the econometric implications, the 
purpose here is to show that the OPE approach to measurement errors should be given 
more prominence in economic models, especially where rational expectations are a 
feature.   
    Students often do not have a choice whether to have their examinations 
graded.  Once entered, there is no possibility of deciding afterwards not to let the 
teacher see the script.  However, from Section II onwards, it is assumed that students 
do have this opportunity.  The reason for this strange assumption is that the type of 
economic problem envisaged often involves a self-selection rule, for example whether 
or not to apply for a particular job.  There may be an advantage in deciding not to be 
graded, because there is a saving on the marking fee, which could include non-
pecuniary costs such as, among others, the humiliation of failure. The point of interest 
is the selection rule.  Assuming that decisions are made rationally, how do the 
numbers of students who find it worthwhile to have the examination graded by the 
teacher change as uncertainty varies?  Do more select to be graded as teachers become 
more competent?  Section II shows that the answer to this question is not 
straightforward and unusual outcomes are possible.  
   Errors are the key driving feature.  Both the student and the teacher have an 
imperfect idea about the true examination mark, so there is two sided uncertainty. 
Both do their best with the objective to be fair and unbiased markers, but both are 
aware that the student and the teacher grades are subject to error.    Students take 
account of the fact that the teacher is an imperfect marker in deciding whether to be 
graded, as well as their own assessment of how well they have done.  This twist is 
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 important in practical situations.  As an application, think of the potential criminal 
(student).  The decision to undertake a criminal activity (have the exam graded) is 
influenced by how well the criminal thinks the authorities (the teacher) can accurately 
detect (assess the grade) the criminal activity.      
I. The Examination Marking Paradigm 
 A typical structure for the classical error model is 
(1) ,         vzq +=
where q is the observed variable,  z ),(~ 2zzN σ   is the true value and  is 
the error term.    The key point of the classical approach is that q and v are positively 
correlated.  Assuming z and v are uncorrelated,  then the covariance between q and v 
is .   It is well known that this error generating mechanism leads to biases in the 
estimated coefficients in a regression model.    Alan B. Krueger and Mikael Lindahl 
(2001) provide an example (there are probably thousands in the literature) where 
noisy data are used as an explanation for the poor performance of many human capital 
models. 
),0(~ 2vNv σ
2
vσ
Is the classical approach a useful starting point in thinking about examination 
marking errors?  Think of q in (1) as the mark awarded by the teacher.  It is composed 
of two components. The first is z, which is the unobservable true mark and v 
represents the teacher’s unavoidable error.   As a model of examination marking, this 
has a fatal drawback.  The problem is that if q is the observed distribution of marks, 
then a person awarded a higher than average grade ( zq > ) tends to receive too 
generous a mark and contrariwise a person with a below average grade ( zq < ) tends 
to receive too low a mark.  If a teacher grades according to this statistical model, he or 
she quickly realizes that a high q is partly the result of generous marking, not a high z. 
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 Why should a teacher systematically over-mark and under-mark at the opposite ends 
of the grading scale?  It is implausible to believe that people with high marks are 
treated with more generosity than they typically deserve and those with low grades 
are systematically hard done by.  The classical measurement error model is 
inappropriate because in this instance a competent teacher has personal insight into 
the fact that grades can never be awarded with complete accuracy.  The errors are not 
mechanically generated. 
The competent teacher would reasonably claim that his or her marks are 
unbiased along all points of the marking scale, not just at the mean value, which is 
what a naïve interpretation of (1) implies.  Nobody can deny this is what a fair-
minded teacher aspires to achieve.  Believers in rational expectations would also 
reject the classical error structure for the teacher’s marking errors. 
The examination marking model has the property that the expected value of 
the error for any given awarded mark is zero, i.e. the teacher is not systematically 
biased in the way that the classical approach implies.  The “insightful” teacher 
recognizes that the classical approach does not meet this objective and implicitly 
weights q  to eliminate the bias.  Here a linear weighting scheme is considered.  Let 
the reported marks be 
(2) ,         bqaz +=~
where a and b are weights.  The distribution of marking errors is then  
(3) εε ++=⇒−= bqazzz ~ .       
Being unbiased at all points along the marking scale requires that 0~| =zEε , i.e. 
0),~cov( =εz .  It is easily seen that  and the value of b 
that ensures a zero covariance is calculated as 
222)1(),~cov( vz bbbz σσε −−=
22
2
vz
zb σσ
σ
+=  and a )1( bz −=  ensures 
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 that zzE =)~( .  This also utilizes the information from the examination scripts in the 
most efficient way, because the weighting scheme minimizes . 2εσ
In the classical model, q is the distribution of the observed marks and v is the 
distribution of errors.  In the examination marking model z~  is the distribution of 
observed marks and ε is the distribution of errors.  No complicated statistical 
knowledge is required to generate z~  in the same way as an expert pool player can pot 
balls without any understanding of Mechanics.  It is the idea of being fair, whilst 
recognizing that complete accuracy is impossible.     
This is a signal extraction model.  In a typical signal extraction problem,  q is 
the observed (noisy) variable.  For example, in the famous Robert E. Lucas (1977) 
model, q refers to an observed price rise, which is composed of an unobserved general 
price rise (z) and an unobserved relative price rise (v).   The best guess of z is z~ .  In 
the examination marking model z~ is reported directly and q is unobserved.  
The examination marking model effectively reduces to the OPE model with 
ε+= zz ~ , and 0),~cov( =εz .  Writing it in the form of (2) and (3) is useful, where v 
is derived from z andε   ( bbzzv /])1)([( ε−−−= ).  It shows the connection with the 
idea of signal extraction using noisy scripts to extract information about true grades.  
Although (2) and (3) appear more elaborate than is strictly necessary, they give a 
more tractable analysis in the end.  The b parameter ( 10 ≤≤ b ) measures the accuracy 
of grading, with b=1 representing perfect marking. 
The OPE approach to examination marking has much to commend it.  The 
variance of the reported marks is , which is less than the variance of the true 
grades as long as the marking is less than accurate.
2
zbσ
2  An incompetent teacher, who is 
unable to extract any useful information about the true grades from the scripts, simply 
assigns each candidate the average score z in this statistical model of examination 
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 marking.  By contrast, the classical errors in variables model typically predicts the 
opposite.   In practice, a smaller variance is more likely.  Teachers are frequently 
observed to be reluctant to use all points of the marking scale.  Grading the range of 
papers that an economist normally takes illustrates this.  Mathematics and 
econometrics papers (where b is likely to be close to 1) generally show a bigger 
spread of grades than `essay’ type examinations.   
Table (1) illustrates the tendency of regression towards the mean in awarding 
grades.  It shows the results of the 2003 round of the British Civil Service Selection 
Boards (CSSB) for the Fast Stream.  This is a major annual competition that recruits 
elite Civil Servants, who are expected to fill the most senior posts as their career 
progresses.  Around 18,000 apply, but only 1398 made it to the final selection boards 
in 2003.  The boards involve a series of tests spread over three days, where much of 
the assessment is imprecise and judgmental. Decisiveness, lucidity, robustness, 
impartiality, ability to collaborate, interpersonal sensitivity and adaptability are each 
assessed on a marking scale, which are then (again based on assessors’ judgment) 
mapped into an overall point score.  Those graded four or better are successful, but 
grades better than four mean candidates are picked out for the most desirable jobs.  
Similarly, near miss candidates might have an opportunity to re-apply – so the scale 
does matter and CSSB assessors spend much time deciding on precise grades.  Table 
(1) shows that only 3.3 percent of candidates are found in three out of the seven 
categories and none in the top category.  Clearly, it is implausible to believe that 
nobody in 2003 was in the top grade one – after all the competition aims to find the 
very best graduates across all British universities.  Nevertheless, the signal extraction 
view of grading suggests that the assessors (who themselves are an elite of top civil 
servants and nobody’s fool) are nevertheless reaching correct (unbiased) judgments.  
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 They are implicitly recognizing that the competencies assessed to be a top civil 
servant can only be imprecisely measured.  All this is despite the best efforts of the 
Cabinet Office, who explicitly advise assessors “the full range of the scale is meant to 
be used”. 
There is also a lot of evidence that errors in survey data are not classical  
which is reviewed in Bound et al. (2001).3  However, an important point to make is 
that the OPE model is different from the so-termed mean reverting error model, which 
is sometimes referred to as a non-classical error.   John Bound and Alan B. Krueger 
(1991) discuss this case where they explore direct evidence with response data 
containing measurement errors matched with observations on the true value found 
from independent sources.  The approach is to posit (1) as the error generating 
mechanism, but with a covariance term between z and v. Let this covariance be 
zvσρσ . They describe this as a non-classical mean reversion model.  In this case 
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The question is whether the examination marking model is a special case of this.    If 
q is the reported distribution, setting the covariance between q and v to zero (as in the 
examination marking model) requires 
(5) 
z
v
σ
σρ −= .          
Interestingly, Bound and Krueger (1991) find evidence of a fairly strong negative 
covariance or mean reversion effect, which is highly suggestive that the examination 
marking model may be a better starting point than the classical errors model.  
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 For (5) to hold requires that the variance of the errors is less than the variance of 
the true values, because ρ  cannot be less than -1.  The examination marking model is 
not so restricted.  It is somewhat disingenuous to claim that only some teachers are 
capable of being unbiased.  The examination marking model looks at the problem in a 
different way, giving a good reason for a negative covariance, compared with an ad 
hoc “covariance corrected” classical errors model.   
 
II.  Examination Marking and Self-selection 
 
A model of two sided uncertainty is set out, but in order to draw out some 
interesting issues the initial focus is on a special one sided uncertainty case.  The 
special case supposes that students are able to grade with complete accuracy, but the 
teacher is unable to match this precision.  Despite this, students are never asked to 
grade themselves because such a process lacks credibility.  Students have every 
incentive to cheat in reporting their grades.  Now suppose that students who pass the 
examination are awarded a prize, with opting to be graded being voluntary but subject 
to a marking fee.  Students self-select into those for whom the gamble is worthwhile.  
Self-selection is partly determined by a knowledge about how accurately the teacher 
grades.  It turns out that there is sometimes a specific degree of teacher marking 
inaccuracy that makes students self-select into only those with a passing grade or 
better.  Logically all these students should pass and furthermore the teacher knows 
this.  However, because the teacher marks inaccurately many of these students are 
failed.  There appears to be a classic time inconsistency problem.  The short-run best 
solution is to pass everyone without grading the papers, but then this alters the self-
selection behavior.  Next time round everyone elects for assessment, because students 
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 know papers are not actually graded.  Rejection of some papers that are known to be 
of passing quality is necessary to ensure the integrity of the self-selection process.  It 
is shown how credibility can be restored by altering the way in which scripts are 
marked and varying the entrance fee in a very simple way. 
The assumption that students can grade perfectly is far from ridiculous.  First, 
making extreme assumptions gives useful insights about more realistic situations.  
Secondly, in many applications the student may be the better grader compared with 
the teacher. Think of the accused (student) facing a jury (teacher), where the student 
knows the truth and the jury is unsure.  Alternatively,  think of the person selling a 
used car.  The seller knows the truth about mechanical condition, but the purchaser is 
unsure.  Thirdly, an examination may be the means to evaluate a student’s 
understanding of a course rather than merely the content of an examination script.  
Students may have a much better insight as to the amount of deep learning that has 
occurred than the teacher. 
Both the teacher and students follow the examination marking model when 
grading.  The statistical model replicates the discussion of eqs (2) and (3).  For the 
teacher 
(6)  
22
2
)1(
0),~cov()(~
ϕσσ
σββα
εεϕβαε
+=−=
=+++=+=
z
zz
rzrz
 . 
r~ is the distribution of  awarded grades, ),(~ 2zzNz σ is the distribution of true 
marks, ε is the distribution of marking errors and 
),0(~/])1)([( 2ϕσβεβϕ Nzz −−−= .  The parameter β  ( 10 ≤≤ β ) is a measure of 
the accuracy of the teacher, with higher values indicating greater accuracy and β = 1 is 
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 when the teacher is perfect marker.  A similar set-up prevails for students’ evaluation 
of their own performance, 
(7)  
22
2
)1(
0),~cov()(~
δσσ
σππγ
ζζδπγζ
+=−=
=+++=+=
z
zz
qzqz
. 
q~  is the distribution of  student grades.  The parameterπ  measures student accuracy, 
which typically differs from the teacher.    
The breakeven probability that makes it worthwhile to have the examination 
graded is set at p*.  This is the fee/prize ratio in the risk neutral case, but p* can 
exceed this if there is risk aversion and in practical cases the “fee” and  “prize” are 
monetary equivalents reflecting a variety of costs and rewards.  The same p* is 
assumed for all.  If students assess the probability of passing as , they elect to 
have the examination graded.  Students use to calculate this probability and know β 
and π when making this calculation.  The decision to enter is rationally based. 
*p≥
q~
If the teacher grades perfectly, then the expected pass rate is , where 
z
)( TzzP ≥
T  is the  pass mark standard.  However, the teacher can only set a target pass mark 
for the observed grades.  Denoting this pass mark as Tr~ , then the expected pass rate is  
)~~( TrrP ≥ .  If the teacher’s objective is to fix zT and make )()~~( TT zzPrrP ≥=≥ , then  
Tr~   must vary with β.  In actual fact, nothing substantive changes if  Tr~   is fixed at zT, 
but the former assumption is a  more appealing idea and leads to a selection equation 
which is symmetric in β and π. 
The rational student knows his or her value and calculatesq~ )~|~~( qrrP T≥ , 
where the parameters of (6) and (7) are known.   This means that the accuracy or 
otherwise of the teacher in his or her ability to grade examinations has an influence on 
the student’s decision whether or not to be graded.  A higher makes it more likely to q~
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 pass (excepting the extreme case where π = 0). A breakeven value of  can therefore 
be calculated above which it is worthwhile to enter.  The appendix shows that the 
critical value is , where 
q~
q(
(8)  
5.0
5.0
1
)( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= βπ
βπ
βπ p
zq (
(( . 
q(  is the standardized critical value of , thus  q~ q( = 0 means exactly 50 percent choose 
to be graded and a higher value means fewer elect to be graded.  As well as β and π , 
this depends on z(  and .  p( z(  is the standardized value of zT , i.e. ZT zzz σ/)( −=(  . 
Thus z( = 0 means the pass mark is z , and higher values mean a higher zT.   is the 
standardized  value of  p*, thus 
p(
p( = 0 means the breakeven probability is 50 percent.  
Students who assess their chances of passing  at or better than 50 percent enter in this 
case.  Higher values of mean a fall in the breakeven probability, meaning that more 
elect to be graded ceteris paribus. 
p(
This selection equation has a very simple structure.4     One sided uncertainty 
problems are just special cases of this general selection rule.  Derek Leslie (2004) 
explores one such case without showing how it fits within the general framework 
explored here.  The problem concerns the decision whether to submit a paper for peer 
review to an academic journal.  The person submitting is the student, who 
inaccurately assesses the paper’s worth and the teacher is the referee, who is assumed 
to have β =1.   
The special case considered here is the complementary problem when students 
are able to grade themselves perfectly with π  = 1, but the teacher is inaccurate.  With 
perfect student grading, .  This case is interesting because it highlights the issue 
of credibility.  Students use  to determine those who elect to be graded and the 
zq =~
q~
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 teacher uses r~ to determine the grades.  The teacher cannot use information from 
directly.  To see this consider those values ofq~ β  when zq (( = .  This means that only 
those with a passing grade self-select to be graded by the teacher.  Despite this, 
students that enter know that there is a chance (depending on the value of β ) that the 
teacher fails them.  There are two such possible values.  The trivial case is when 
β =1.  In this baseline case there is no teacher uncertainty; only those who pass elect 
to be graded and the omniscient teacher duly passes them.  However, the more 
interesting case occurs when 
(9)  
p
z
(
(
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+ 5.0
5.0
5.0
1
1
β
β . 
This square root exists when either p(  and z( are positive or when they are both 
negative.  In addition 
(10)  22
22
5.0
pz
pz
((
((
+
−=β . 
This square root exists when 22 pz (( > .  The four cases  (with )1=π show how self-
selection varies as β  goes from 1 to 0. 
1. When  and  and 22 pz (( > p( z(  are both positive, the number of students who 
elect to be graded at first increases and later steadily declines to zero.  When 
(10) holds the numbers who enter exactly equals those with . Tzz ≥
2. When 22 pz (( >  and  and p( z(  are both negative, the number of students who 
elect to be graded at first decreases and later steadily increases towards 100%.  
As before, there is a crossover point when the numbers who enter are exactly 
those with . Tzz ≥
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 3. In other cases the number of students who elect to be graded either steadily 
declines or steadily increases. 
As an example, if the pass mark is set at the highest 30 percent of the z 
distribution and the fee is such that only those with a probability of passing at or 
above 40 percent think it worthwhile to enter, then it turns out that 386.0=β ensures 
that exactly the top 30 percent of candidates decide to be graded.  However, 
386.0=β  means that only 58.8 percent of those graded are predicted to pass the 
exam. 
(10) illustrates the credibility issue, where some information cannot be directly 
exploited.  In this special case, the preferred option is to ignore all the information 
from r~ .  The problem is that if this is done, students exploit this knowledge and 
report misleadingly high grades.  Passing everyone who elects to be graded is 
equivalent to this because, if everyone is passed, everyone opts for grading. This is 
not a satisfactory state of affairs.  In this extreme case it appears necessary to fail 
some students (even though the teacher knows they should all pass) to enforce the 
credibility of the selection rule.  Is this unfair?  At first blush, this seems to be the 
case; after all, it goes against common sense to think that some students are failed, 
even though it is known that they all should pass.  At a deeper level, perhaps it is not 
unfair to failed students.  The selection rule is nothing more than a sophisticated 
gamble and students enter if the bet is “in the money” when .  Students take 
on the bet with their eyes open.  They know in advance that there is a risk of failure, 
even though they know they have a passing grade when they decide to be graded.  
The objective odds dictate they should enter, and like all bets that are in the money 
there should be no regrets if the wrong horse wins.  However, the logic is somewhat 
uncomfortable.   As an example think of the job market and the case where the 
*pp ≥
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 rejected candidates come from a minority group.  It is hard to justify the morality of a 
position where candidates with a passing grade are rejected. 
Can the teachers exploit the selection information when (10) holds?  The teacher’s 
objectives are to increase the pass rate and also to reduce the marking load.  Can this 
be credibly achieved?  The answer is yes.  Suppose the teacher announces that a 
randomly selected fraction of submitted scripts will be passed without any attempt at 
grading, but with the rest graded as usual.  If a student had previously assessed his or 
her probability of passing at p, the new probability is 
(11)  , pmmmp )1()( −+=
where m is the fraction automatically passed.  Clearly for any given , the probability 
of passing has increased, which causes more students to wish to be graded.  However, 
raising the marking fee, which raises the breakeven probability that makes it 
worthwhile to be graded, discourages this process.  Consequently, if the fee is suitably 
adjusted, it is possible to achieve the same (all passing) proportion of students who 
opt for grading.  Figure 1 illustrates this idea.  The lower line (typically non-linear), 
labeled , plots the relationship between the probability of being passed by the 
teacher and students’ normalized , when 
q~
)~(qf
q~ 0=m .  The critical value  associated 
with p* is shown.  The upper curve shows the relationship when the teacher 
automatically passes the fraction m.  This is just 
q(
)~()1( qfmm −+ .  It can be seen that 
raising p*  to p** *)1( pmm −+=  ensures the same critical value q( . 
So what does this adjustment process achieve?  The teacher gains, because 
there are fewer scripts to mark and they collect more in fees.  Students gain because a 
larger fraction of scripts is passed overall.  They pay for this because the prize for 
passing remains the same, but they must pay a higher fee in return for a higher pass 
rate.  It can be seen from the figure, that there is no real upper limit on m as long as it 
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 lies below 1.  So in the limit as ,  fewer scripts are graded and  more students 
are passed.  It appears that the teacher can exploit  without requiring students to 
reveal their grades directly (when they have an incentive to lie). 
1→m
q~
The same idea can be applied in other circumstances.  Suppose case 3 prevails and  
that those who elect to be graded steadily decline as β falls.  With 1<β , some 
students with a passing grade deem it not worthwhile to enter.   The same principle of 
a random audit can be applied, but now the objective is to change p*  to ensure that all 
those with a passing grade choose to enter.  Similarly, if the numbers who enter 
steadily increases, with too many now entering when  1<β , the two instruments of a 
random audit and changes in p* can ensure that only those with a passing grade have 
their examinations graded.  In the limit, the same condition holds in all circumstances.  
Set the fee such that it is only worthwhile to be graded if there is a very small but 
finite chance of being audited.  Then set m close to one.  Credibility requires that 
students believe there is a finite probability of being audited, otherwise all failing 
students enter. 
III.  Two Sided Uncertainty 
 
With two sided uncertainty there are four cases among those that are graded.  
There is a probability p1 that the individual is passed ( )~ Trr ≥  and is of a passing 
standard ( .  There is a probability p)Tzz ≥ 2  that the individual is failed but is of a 
passing standard.  There is a probability p3 that the individual is passed but is of a 
failing standard. Finally, there is a probability p4  that the individual is failed and is of 
a failing standard.  For example, with 4.0=β and 9.0=π , then 29.6 percent enter, p1  
=  53.0 percent, p2  =  32.7 percent, p3  =  4.8 percent and p4  =  9.5 percent.  Because 
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 of two sided uncertainty, mistakes are inevitable. A smaller p2 and p3 is the more 
desirable outcome. 
The same random audit procedure can be applied to manipulate these 
probabilities.  Let m denote the fraction automatically passed as before.  If the 
breakeven probability of entry is maintained at the existing level, by manipulating the 
fee/reward structure, then  the new probabilities are 
(12)   
.)1()(
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)1()(
)(
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−=
+=
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+=
Raising m increases p1(m) and reduces p2(m). Since p1(m) are the true passes and 
p2(m) are the incorrect failures, this is a desirable outcome.  However, this comes at 
the expense of an undesirable increase in false passes p3(m).5  It is now a matter of 
preference as to whether the random audit procedure is applied and by how much.  
The higher p2 – p4  then the bigger is the reduction in p2(m) relative to any increase in 
p3(m).  The pay-off to a random audit increases directly with the size of  p2 – p4 .  
Effectively if students do a good job at self-evaluation (π  is high) then p4  tends to be 
low.  Similarly, if the teacher is not so good at grading (β is low) then p2 tends to be 
high.  Hence the random audit is a better option when π  is high and β is low.  In the 
special case when 1=π ,  then p4  is zero and  the random audit is always desirable 
because there is no downside to the trade-off (other than a higher entrance fee).   
 
IV.  Knowing the Truth 
 
If students always reveal the truth about q , student evaluations could be used as a 
second marker, just as in actual examinations when double marking is used to 
~
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 improve accuracy.  The teacher and student grades are then combined to give the best 
estimate of the true mark.  Let the combined grades be6   
(13)  qrc ~)1(~~ λλ −+= . 
The weights are chosen to minimize the variance of the errors of the combined grades 
(in general, simply averaging the two marks is not the best option in blind double 
marking).   The selection rule is now based on )~|~( qccP T≥ , i.e. students take account 
of the fact that their own (honest) evaluations are combined with the teacher grade 
when deciding whether to enter (cT  is the implied passing grade). Hence the 
probability of entry differs for any given π  and β  compared with the previous 
situation. As an example, suppose π  = 1.  In this case students know that  
irrespective of the value of β.  Only those who know they will pass, therefore, enter. 
This is 30 percent if the pass mark is set at the highest 30 percent of the z distribution.  
In the previous case the selection probability changes. 
zc =~
In the absence of any additional information, the combined grade gives the 
maximum degree of accuracy for the true examination mark.  There is accordingly 
little incentive for the random audit procedure, given that the information from  has 
been utilized efficiently.  With the same parameter values as before, p
q~
2 falls to 0.9 
percent and p4 falls to 1.4 percent. 
 
V.  Some Applications 
 
Examination marking is applicable to situations where an individual decides 
whether to undertake some activity and where, if the activity is undertaken, someone 
else judges it.  Both sides are uncertain as to the exact value of the activity.  The 
examination marking model does not mirror every detail of the following examples, 
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 but it should  be clear how examination marking describes the basic structure.  In 
other words, it may be a good reference point and it is always useful to recognize that 
different problems have a common parent model.   
 
A. Submitting to an Academic Journal. 
 
Students are those thinking of submitting to an academic journal, where z is the 
distribution of true quality of academic papers and  is the distribution of authors’ 
opinions of their work.  The teacher is the journal’s refereeing process, with 
q~
r~ representing the ability of the referee to identify z.  The journal aims to publish 
papers with .  Leslie (2004) explores this application. Tzz ≥
 
B. Applying for a Job 
 
Students are those thinking of applying for a job, where z is the distribution of 
productivity and q  the distribution of potential applicants’ opinion of their 
productivity.  The teacher is the interviewing panel, with 
~
r~ representing the 
distribution of the evaluation of productivity of potential applicants.  The aim is to 
hire those with .  Edmund S. Phelps (1972) explores a special case of this type 
model. 
Tzz ≥
  
C. Crime 
 
Students are those thinking of undertaking some action, where z is a distribution  
measuring the “morality” of the action.  Only those actions with  are Tzz ≥
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 considered moral, otherwise they are considered immoral and subject to sanction.  
The problem is that both the potential criminal and the authorities are uncertain as to 
what the true value of z is.  The selection equation in this case tells us which actions 
are undertaken.  The teacher represents the judgment on those actions, where 
r~ represents the ability or otherwise of authority to correctly identify immoral actions.  
The examination marking model recognizes a key point about crime, namely that 
potential criminals are influenced by β.  This is a measure of the degree to which 
criminals think they can “get away with it”.   
 
D.      Loans 
 
Students are those thinking of borrowing money to finance a project, where z 
measures the returns to the project.  Only projects that involve  are financially 
viable. The teacher is the potential lender where 
Tzz ≥
r~ represents the lender’s ability to 
evaluate z.  Joseph E. Stiglitz (1987) analyses this. 
 
E.    The market for lemons. 
 
Students are those thinking of selling something, where z is a distribution of quality.  
Only those with  are not substandard (known as  lemons in the USA).  The 
teacher is the potential purchaser, and 
Tzz ≥
r~ represents the purchaser’s evaluation of z.  
George A. Akerlof (1970) explores this model. 
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F. Marriage. 
 
M and F are in the marriage market.7  M is therefore both the teacher and student of F 
and likewise F is both the student and teacher of M.  Courtship (M marks F and F 
marks M) only occurs if both M and F decide it is worthwhile to enter.  This is not 
straightforward, because the entry decision depends on not just whether M will be 
passed by F, but also on M’s view that F will be acceptable to M (and vice versa for 
F’s decision).  Marriage takes place when both M and F are mutually passed.  Divorce 
occurs when either M and F or both eventually realize that the true grade falls short of 
the awarded (passing grade) mark.  Unlike most examination marking processes, 
courtship sometimes lasts several years and this is where problems may occur.  M and 
F are most probably in love, so the danger is that M allows F (the student) to grade 
herself and likewise F allows M to grade himself.  The examination marking model 
warns that this is likely to lead to misreporting.  Against this, true love may lead to the 
co-operative solution of Section V, which gives the most accurate grades.  All one can 
say is that if M and F have a proper understanding of examination marking, divorce is 
less likely (aim for Section V examination marking) and if divorce happens 
recrimination is minimized.  Even with Section V joint marking, it sometimes turns 
out that Tcc ≥~  but  so no complaints.  Gary S Becker (1973; 1974) analyses 
the marriage market.   
Tzz <
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VI.  Concluding Comments 
  
Applying the OPE framework to examination marking makes sense if it is believed 
that rational agents do not make systematic mistakes in grading.  It is a far better 
anchor point than an ad hoc adjustment to the classical approach.  An inherent 
characteristic of this model is its relevance for the analysis of a range of problems.  
The basic structure is deliberately simple and the two equations (6) and (7) are a good 
start point for a  class of economic problems that involve a selection rule. The model 
can be further developed.  For example, though the pass mark is exogenous, actual 
applications could endogenise this.  As an example, the familiar job search model of 
Stephen A. Lippman and John J. McCall (1976) establishes the optimal value of the 
reservation wage, which maximizes the expected present value of job search.  The 
reservation wage is the pass mark in an examination marking interpretation of the job 
search model.   The fixed reward for a passing grade is useful in highlighting the 
credibility issue, but may be too sharp for some applications.  Rather than a fixed 
reward, this could be linked to the awarded grade. 
 
APPENDIX 
A. Deriving the Selection Rule 
To calculate )~|~( qrrP T≥ , consider the following linear relationship between r~ and 
,   q~
(A1)  . eqgfr ++= ~~
)~()~|~( qgfrePqrrP TT −−≥=≥ .   This depends on the values of f and g as well as 
the distribution of e.   It can be seen that 
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Hence 
(A3)  zfg
q
qr )1(2
~
~,~ ββσ
σ −===  
and 
(A4)  222
~
2
~,~2
~
2 )1(
][
z
q
qr
re σπββσ
σσσ −=−=  
Next derive the critical value of  (denoted as ) associated with p*, by calculating q~ *~q
)~( qbareP T −−≥ for the breakeven probability p* .  Students with   self-select 
to have their examinations graded by the teacher. 
*~~ qq ≥
(A5)  *~)1( qzrp Te ββσ −−−=( , 
where is the critical value of the standard normal distribution associated with p*.   
Let 
p(
z( be the critical value of the standard normal distribution associated with , i.e.  Tz
ZT zzz σ(+= .  As noted is set so thatTr )~( TrrP ≥  equals .  Hence )( TzzP ≥
(A6)  5.05.0)( βσβ zTT zzzzzr (+=−+= . 
Substituting into (A5) 
(A7)  β
σ
β
σ ez pzzq
((
−+= 5.0*~ . 
Letting be the critical value of the standard normal distribution associated with , 
and noting that 
q( *~q
),(~~ 2zzNq πσ , it follows that 
(A8)  
5.0
5.0
1
)( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= βπ
βπ
βπ p
zq (
(( . 
B.  Selection using the combined grades 
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 The combined grades are qrc ~)1(~~ λλ −+= . The weights are chosen to minimize 
(A9)  )~)(~()1(2)~()1()~()~( 22222 rzqzEqzErzEczE −−−+−−+−=− λλλλ  
The optimal value of λ  is 8
(A10)  βππβ
πβλ
2
)1(* −+
−=  
The selection rule uses )~|~( qccP T≥ , where as before cT varies to ensure that 
)()~( TT zzPccP ≥=≥ . To calculate )~|~( qccP T≥ , consider the following linear 
relationship between and .   c~ q~
(A11)  . eqgfc ++= ~~
Going through as before, the equivalent of (A8) is calculated as 
(A12)  
z
e
z
c
g
p
g
zq σπ
σ
σπ
σ
5.05.0
~
((( −=  
where zfg qqc )1(1/
2
~~,~ βλλλβσσ −=−+==  
5.0
~,~
2
~
22
~
2
~ ]*)1(*2)*1(*[ qrqrc σλλσλσλσ −+−+=  and  
5.02
~
2
~,~
2
~ ]/)([ qqcc σσσσε −=  
Although (A12) looks complicated, ultimately it is just a function of β, π, z( and . p(
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FIGURE 1.  HOW PROBABILITIES CHANGE IF A 
FRACTION m IS AUTOMATICALLY PASSED 
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Table 1 
RESULTS OF 2003 (NOV. 02-JUL. 03) CSSB COMPETITION FINAL ROUND 
 
Final Board Mark Numbers  
1 (Highest grade) 0            (0%) 
2 32          (2.3%) 
3 211        (15.2%) 
4 167        (12.0%) 
5 (Failing grade) 708        (51.1%) 
6 254        (18.3%) 
7 (Lowest grade) 14           (1.0%) 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
1 Examples are: Christopher Dougherty (2002), William H. Greene (2003), Damondar 
N. Gujarati (2003), Carter R. Hill et al. (2001), Jan Kmenta (1997), G. S. Maddala 
(2001) and R. L. Thomas (1997).   
2 This is true even if cov( . Derek Leslie (2003) explores a more general 
model of double blind marking. 
3 In some cases there will be an unwillingness to admit to socially undesirable 
behavior.  See Charles T. Clotfelter (1983) on tax evasion as a motive to misreport 
income. Alcohol, cigarette consumption, sexual behavior are other examples where 
respondents are known to lie. 
4 The selection equation can be `individualized’ by simply subscripting π and ( .  So 
the critical value varies according to each student’s own π and p(  values. 
5 This is not the whole population of passing scripts, because selection means that 
some with a passing grade will elect not to be graded.  In the example 6.6 percent of 
those who are not graded have . Tzz ≥
6 The appendix gives a more detailed derivation. 
7   “Marriage” is sometimes used as a metaphor for general matching problems.  See 
Christopher Pissarides (1990) and  Francis Bloch and Harl Ryder (2000). 
8 Leslie (2003) analyses the blind double marking problem.  (A10) assumes that the 
students and teachers grade independently. 
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